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Abstract 
A recent paper in Sci. Adv. by Miller et al. concludes that GREs do not help predict 
whether physics grad students will get Ph.D.s. The paper makes numerous 
elementary statistics errors, including introduction of unnecessary collider-like 
stratification bias, variance inflation by collinearity and range restriction, omission of 
needed data (some subsequently provided), a peculiar choice of null hypothesis on 
subgroups, blurring the distinction between failure to reject a null and accepting a 
null, and an extraordinary procedure for radically inflating confidence intervals in a 
figure. The  paper exhibits exactly the sort of research techniques which we should 
be teaching students to avoid. 
 
“The aim of science is not to open the door to infinite wisdom, but to set a limit to infinite 
error.” ― Bertolt Brecht 
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Introduction 
A recent paper by Miller et al. (1, 2) argues, primarily with regard to the use of GRE scores, that 
“Typical Ph.D. admissions criteria limit access to underrepresented groups but fail to predict 
doctoral completion.” They claim “The weight of evidence in this paper…indicates that lower 
than average scores on admissions exams do not imply a lower than average probability of 
earning a physics Ph.D.“ so that GREs are “metrics that do not predict Ph.D. completion.” These 
are surprising conclusions to reach for a paper whose results are framed in terms of null-
hypothesis p-value cutoffs (3) that shows (see Table 2 of (1)) only one predictor for doctoral 
completion that can be used by admissions committees to select students and has p-value 
<0.01 in the overall sample studied: the GRE quantitative test (GRE-Q).   
In this response I describe several improper statistical methods used in the article. My response 
is not intended to take a position on the complicated issue of desirable admissions criteria but 
only to defend minimal standards of research competence and transparency. I will not explore 
here whether other papers in the field make similar errors but will include some pedagogical 
material on elementary statistics.  
Before evaluating the validity of the paper, we need to clarify what question it is trying to 
answer. The statement “Our goal here was not to identify the best predictive model with the 
minimum number of parameters but rather to understand how all four commonly used 
admissions metrics (UGPA, GRE-Q, GRE-V, and GRE-P) and the most salient demographic 
information would contribute to a discussion of metrics and diversity by admissions 
committees” (1) does not help much. More succinctly, the main goal appears to be to estimate 
how much predictive power for degree completion would be lost by de-emphasizing or 
dropping the GRE components of the admissions criteria. More formally, one wishes to 
evaluate what effect a treatment (inclusion of GREs in admissions criteria) has on an outcome 
(Ph.D. rate). 
Directly evaluating how well students admitted by different criteria would have done requires 
either a randomized trial in which similar programs would be randomly assigned to do GRE-
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aware or GRE-blind admissions (not feasible at the time of the study) or a comparison of non-
randomly assigned programs using modern causal inference methods(4) to attempt to reduce 
systematic errors.  There seem not to have been enough GRE-blind programs to allow such an 
observational study. (1)  Instead, the strategy is to create an implicit model of what causes 
program completion, from which one can try to back out what the effect of dropping GREs 
would have been. Although that reasoning is not spelled out clearly, this plan would be 
reasonable if implemented properly. 
 
The authors model Ph.D. attainment, a crude but convenient dichotomous proxy for broader 
ultimate goals such as scientific productivity, by a standard logistic regression, with the logit 
given by a multivariate linear regression on several predictors. Although use of this 
dichotomous outcome no doubt loses some important dynamic range compared to the 
outcomes of interest, it has the advantage of being easy to quantify without too much time 
delay. The multivariate form is justified as a way to give a better “basis for policy decisions” by 
avoiding “confounding” (1). Since confounding is a purely causal concept, these claims confirm 
that the results  are intended to tell us what the causal effects of policy choices would be. 
Specifically, the model coefficients for the predictors, combined with the ranges of the 
predictors, are intended to tell us how much incremental predictive power would be lost by 
dropping each predictor, i.e. what the causal effects of that policy change would be on 
graduation rate. The predictors include percentile ranks  of GRE scores (quantitative GRE-Q, 
verbal GRE-V, and physics GRE-P), undergraduate GPA, gender, ethnicity/race, U.S. vs. non-U.S. 
citizenship, year of matriculation, and one predictor that an admissions committee constrained 
by causality cannot use as an attribute to distinguish between applicants - the rank stratum of 
the program in which the student ultimately enrolled. (1)  Setting aside for now the rank 
stratum, some such procedure, with the usual major caveats, would provide a conventional 
start to estimating which effects could be excluded from admissions decisions without causing 
major reductions in degree completion rates. 
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Several features of their analysis, however, contribute to major over-estimation of the 
statistical uncertainty in estimates of the predictive value of GREs, i.e. to the well-known 
“variance inflation” problem in estimating such parameters.(5) Inclusion of the rank stratum 
can also exacerbate systematic underestimation of the predictive power, already a problem due 
to lack of data on the students who were not admitted. (6) (7) (8) (9) The net result is to 
obscure the statistical reliability of the conclusion that those tests help predict which students 
are likely to get a PhD. 
 
Variance Inflation from Collinearity 
The main issue being addressed by the paper is not how well one can distinguish the separate 
predictive coefficients of GRE-Q and GRE-P but rather, since they show similar disparities 
among demographic groups (1, 10),  what weight if any should be placed on such tests 
altogether. (1) The model shown includes both GRE-P and GRE-Q as separate variables. The 
scores on these exams are highly correlated(2), i.e. “collinear”, which both inflates the 
uncertainties on the predictive coefficients of each variable (since the model fit is rather 
insensitive to their relative weights) (11)  and divides up their net predictive power into two 
smaller pieces. This can convert a highly significant net predictor into two that appear 
“insignificant”. If, for example, one were to predict people’s height from a model including right 
and left shoe sizes, the two shoe coefficients would be almost completely uncertain since the 
prediction doesn’t care which variable is used. Either shoe could be dropped from the model. A 
very naïve reading of the statistical confidence ranges might suggest that neither shoe size was 
“significant” and therefore both shoes should be dropped from the model. Nevertheless  the 
predictive coefficient for their average would be well-defined, and dropping both shoes from 
the predictive model would weaken predictive power substantially unless there were good 
substitutes. (11) The predictive coefficient for their sum would show relatively little statistical 
uncertainty. 
 
To avoid the collinearity, one need only take the obvious step of combining GRE-P and GRE-Q 
into a single score, first scaling by the inverses of their ranges to make their contributions of 
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equal weight, since unlike the shoes they have different ranges. (Their predictive powers are 
similar enough that almost nothing is gained by adding a parameter to give them unequal 
weights.) Although the follow-up paper(1, 2) contains some general discussion of collinearity, 
the simple step of calculating the net GRE effect and its uncertainty for this obvious 
combination is omitted. The 10th to 90th percentile ranges for the U.S.  group can be seen in Fig. 
2 (1), with GRE-P having ~1.5 times as large a range as GRE-Q in this cohort, so the equal-
weighted sum is close to P+1.5Q, i.e. 1.5Q has about the same range as P. Using data from 
Table 2 its coefficient (GRE-P coefficient +(1/1.5)*GRE-Q coefficient) is virtually identical 
(0.0116 per percentile, within 1%) in the entire sample (“All Students”) and the three subgroups 
described (U.S., U.S. female, and U.S. male).  
 
The paper(1) relies heavily on p-value significance cutoffs(3) to claim that the GREs are not 
predictors. The follow-up paper now gives the correlation coefficient between the estimated 
predictive coefficients for these two tests, -0.42. (2) Due to this large negative correlation the 
standard error in the estimated coefficient of the weighted sum, 
SESUM=(SEP2+(SEQ/1.5)2-2*0.42* SEP*SEQ/1.5)1/2,  is much less than it would be if the tests were 
independent. (Here I use the approximation that the other coefficients, e.g. for GPA, change 
little when the GREs are combined, although this combination has slightly different weighting 
than the one found with separately adjusted coefficients.) Using  SEP and SEQ from Table 2 gives 
a standard error for the coefficient in  the All Students group of 0.0026, less than ¼ of the 
coefficient’s point estimate. In other words, based on the data of the paper and the follow-up, 
the GRE predictive effect is a 4.5-sigma effect overall, far more statistically significant than any 
conventional cutoff value for such problems. In the U.S. subgroup, it’s a 3.4-sigma effect. 
Among U.S. males it’s a 3.0-sigma effect. Even in the smallest subgroup, U.S. females, for which 
the point estimate of the net GRE predictive coefficient is virtually identical to the other groups, 
it’s a 1.5-sigma effect. (Each of these is approximate due to limited precision of the reported 
standard errors.) Each of these effect/sigma ratios would increase further if the irrelevant GRE-
V were dropped from the model. (Even simpler, just dropping either GRE-P or GRE-Q would 
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leave the other as clearly significant except in the small U.S. female subgroup, although not as 
strong as the simple equal-weight sum. Think of the shoes.) 
 
To convert this robust coefficient to a net effect size for the combined GRE-P and GRE-Q we 
must allow for standard deviation (i.e. range) of the test combination being slightly less than 
the sum of the two separate standard deviations, which are equal for the range-weighted sum, 
by a factor of ((1+rPQ)/2)1/2 where rPQ is their correlation coefficient. Although no correlation 
data were included in the original paper, the subsequent  note(2) gives rPQ=0.55 for their 
sample,  allowing us now to calculate the effect size for the sum. The 10th to 90th percentile 
effects for each test within the U.S. group  are ~0.48 and ~0.35, respectively, reading the ranges 
and logit changes from Fig. 2, with slopes checked via Table 2 (1).  Using the approximation  
that the 10th to 90th percentile range for the sum scales like the standard deviation, the effect 
size from the 10th to 90th percentile is then a logit of (1.55/2)1/2(0.48+0.35) = ~0.73 in the U.S. 
subgroup. Most of this predictive power could be obtained from the GRE-Q alone if GRE-P were 
dropped, but that would have little effect on the demographic disparities in the net criterion. 
 
The GRE effect is thus not only very statistically significant but also slightly  larger than the 
effect size of GPA in the U. S. subgroup, ~0.6 from Fig. 2. In the total sample,  All Students, for 
which the predictive power of GPA apparently collapses by a factor of 2, (1) the GREs provide 
much greater predictive power than GPA. Thus, even before we get to the more interesting and 
serious systematic problems, we see that based on the data of Miller et al. (1, 2)  the obvious 
weighted sum of GREs provides the best general predictor in their model in the group of all 
students and is approximately tied with GPA in the U.S. subgroup, although none of the 
predictors are very powerful. 
 
Stratification and Variance Inflation, Confounding, and Collider-Like Bias 
The model chosen includes the rank of the graduate program in which the student enrolled, via 
an adjustable extra term for three rank strata. (1)  Clearly this variable is not one that an 
admissions committee lacking pre-cognition could use to decide among competing applicants. 
  
7/1/19 7 
(Interaction terms between rank and other predictors could be used to help different programs 
choose different criteria, but no such terms are included in the model reported (1) or in the 
later addition.(2)) Does rank nevertheless belong in a model estimating the predictive value of 
other metrics?  
 
Before we get to the big problem from stratification, systematic bias in coefficient estimates, it 
is important first to recognize that it creates another variance inflation.  The rank of the 
student’s program is no doubt positively correlated with the standard predictors in the model 
(GREs and GPA), so including it as a quantitative variable would create variance inflation in 
estimates of their coefficients.  Stratification has essentially the same variance-inflating effect 
because of the restricted range of those predictors within each rank stratum.  This problem of 
restricted range in predictive modeling is very well known, especially in the context of 
educational and employment decisions (e.g. (6) (12)), and has even been described vividly in 
the specific context of physics GREs.(7) Although the variation in outcomes within each narrow 
stratum may correlate only weakly with the predictor variable of interest, that says little about 
how well the outcomes would correlate with the predictor if the predictor were discarded in 
admissions decisions.  
 
In one especially relevant study(6), the GRE validity in predicting performance of psychology 
students in classes on statistics, assessments, and research methods was found to be high  
(0.55 to 0.70) in a program with little range restriction, in contrast to much lower validity in a 
range-restricted subset or to typical low validity values for predicting grades in more range-
restricted programs. In one actual experimental comparison involving two components of a 
Swedish driving test, their correlation in a restricted group (those who passed the first test) was  
less than half their correlation in an unrestricted group (in which everyone was allowed to take 
the second test).  (12) 
 
Reducing the range of a predictive variable by about a factor of three while keeping the same 
total number of data points (corresponding to division into three strata) would increase the 
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standard error in its coefficient estimates by about a factor of three. Restricting the range of 
outcome-linked variables (e.g. program rank) produces much less inflation of the standard 
errors for the predictive slopes because the range of any one predictor is less restricted, but at 
the expense of introducing systematic bias (6) (7) (8) (9)  in the slope estimate due to range 
restriction of the net predictor, as I discuss below. Although we’ve seen that simply combining 
the GRE-P and GRE-Q scores is already sufficient to give a statistically robust effect estimate 
except in the smallest subgroup described, in the published paper the extra range-restriction 
variance inflation helped give the impression of the effect being insignificant. According to the 
follow-up version (2) the covariances between the predictive coefficients for strata and for the 
other variables have been calculated, but are not reported. Therefore one cannot tell by how 
much removing the stratum variable would increase the statistical significance of the GRE 
coefficient or whether that significance would cross the conventional threshold even in the 
smallest subgroup, U.S. females. 
 
What is unusual about the Miller et al. analysis is not that there was a restricted range problem, 
since a school or employer typically does not have performance data on the those who either 
were not offered a position in their institution or did not choose to take it. What’s peculiar is 
that the restricted range here was largely a self-inflicted problem created by stratifying the 
students by program rank. (1) Miller et al. state that one of the strengths of their study is that it 
includes a wide range for the predictive variables because it includes schools of very different 
ranks, (1) but they do not use that range to narrow the statistical uncertainties in the 
parameter estimates. 
 
Is that major loss of precision justified by the need to avoid systematic errors? Although Miller 
et al. say they “…include covariates to render more precise [sic] estimates” it is well known that 
including covariates can make estimates either more or less systematically biased, depending 
on which covariates are included and, of course, on what one wishes to estimate.(4) (8) (9) 
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Miller et al. find that even after taking into account GPA, GREs, etc. students in the higher-
ranked programs have a higher likelihood of completion. (1) Using their stratified model to 
evaluate the incremental predictive power of GREs implicitly assumes that this boost is caused 
entirely by factors that would not change if students with lower scores were admitted to those 
programs. They emphasize the possibility that highly ranked programs might directly make it 
easier for any students they accept to succeed, in which case the boost would be maintained 
regardless of changes in selection procedure. Program rank would be a simple confounder of 
the estimate of the potential effects of changing selection methods and therefore should be 
removed via stratification. The actual sign of any such direct effects of the program rank on 
graduation likelihood is not known, however. Anecdotal stories suggest that it might be 
negative.  
 
A more obvious reason for the boost in graduation rate in high-ranked programs in the model is 
that almost all admissions committees take into account many out-of-model predictors 
(research experience, recommendations, etc. ) as has been thoroughly documented by a group 
including one of the Miller et al. authors. (13). Unless that ubiquitous effort is pointless, these 
predictors will have some positive predictive value, which will be reflected in the coefficient of 
the rank variable, as Miller et al. also acknowledge. (1) The model itself does not know how 
much of the association between an in-model predictor (e.g. GPA) and the outcome comes 
from correlation with these out-of-model predictors. If the out-of-model predictors are 
positively correlated with an in-model predictor such as GPA, they will increase the coefficient 
that the model assigns to that predictor beyond what would actually be lost by dropping the 
predictor, but if they are negatively correlated they will decrease that coefficient.  
 
In the overall population of applicants, it is reasonable to assume that the out-of-model 
predictors are positively correlated with GREs and GPA. Once the population is stratified, 
however, even by mere restriction to those who enrolled in some program, the correlation 
between in-model and out-of-model predictors tends to turn negative within each stratum, as 
Alex Small has nicely illustrated. (7) The reason is not hard to understand: a student with low in-
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model predictors enrolled in a mid-rank program probably got in there because of good out-of-
model predictors. A student having high in-model predictors in that mid-rank program probably 
didn’t get in somewhere with higher rank because of weak out-of-model predictors. In an 
analogous case, although performances on long-jumps and 110 meter races are likely to be 
positively correlated in the general population, within the narrow stratum of Olympic 
decathletes these have a strongly negative correlation. (14)   
 
Since the group of all enrolled students has already been stratified by omitting those who were 
not accepted, a negative contribution to the correlation between in-model and out-of-model 
predictors is unavoidable. (7)  The effect is not small. For example, if both in and out 
contributions are independent normally distributed and given equal weight, mere selection of 
applicants with an overall above-average score gives a correlation coefficient of -1/(p-1) = -0.47, 
obtained from simply integrating over the remaining stratum to find the covariance matrix of 
the two predictors. Similar results are found in simulations for a variety of selection procedures, 
e.g. selection of the top 23% in the above model gives a correlation of -0.62. (7) The more finely 
rank is stratified, the more negative these correlations become. (7) In the ideal limit of narrow 
rank stratification and admissions criteria successfully aimed to maximize a particular goal, all 
power for predicting that goal using any variables other than rank becomes zero regardless of 
how predictive they are in the unstratified population, since no variation is left within each 
stratum.  That remains true regardless of how much range remains for any individual predictor.  
That program rank should be a relatively good predictor in the highly stratified Miller et al. 
model thus tells us very little other than that admissions committees are actually making use of 
the out-of-model predictors that they say they use. (13) 
 
This problem with stratification should not have been hard to foresee. By 1993, one empirical 
study already concluded  “These results support the conventional argument that uncorrected 
GRE validity estimates based on range-restricted samples are strongly biased toward zero.”  
(6) Warnings of similar problems specifically for physics graduate programs were available in 
2017.(7) More generally, the systematic errors introduced in causal inference studies by 
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conditioning on stratified groups downstream of the suspected cause are well-known under the 
names “collider-stratification” selection bias or “compensatory effect” bias(4, 8, 9). In one 
famous case, inadvertent conditioning gives the paradoxical effect that maternal smoking 
appears to protect low birth weight newborns from mortality, because within the low birth 
weight stratum smoking is negatively correlated with even more ominous predictors.(15) The 
problem is not merely statistical, in that it does not go away in the large-sample limit. The 
systematic underestimation of predictive coefficients due to stratification selection bias is a 
problem for any coefficients derived from individual programs or other narrow strata, even after 
averaging coefficients over all individual programs or strata. 
The follow-up paper (2) gives some more range data, but entirely ignores the stratification bias 
issue and does not give the ranges of scores in the different strata. The arguments presented 
assume that mere inclusion of the different strata would get rid of problems, rather than 
recognizing that the collider stratification itself creates systematically biased estimates of 
predictive coefficients. 
 
Given the large effect of the unavoidable restriction to enrollees, even a model without any 
deliberate stratification may well underestimate the incremental predictive power of  in-model 
predictors. For example, in the model described above for equal-weight in-model and out-of-
model predictors, even if they are positively correlated (coefficient rOI) in the entire applicant 
population, their correlation in the enrolled upper half is ((p-1)rOI-1)/(p -1-rOI), again obtained 
by integrating over half the bivariate Gaussian distribution to find the terms in the covariance 
matrix. The model would underestimate the in-model coefficients if rOI< 1/(p -1)=0.47. The 
standard errors given for the logit differences between each of the top two rank tiers and the 
bottom one (Table 2 of (1)) in different groups are inflated by less than a factor of 1.3  from the 
values they would have in a model without covariates, easily calculated just by using binomial 
distributions for outcomes in each stratum: (6/Np(1-p))1/2 where N is the total number of 
students in the group and p is the graduation probability. The admission criteria in actual use 
thus must contain significant components orthogonal to the GRE+GPA prediction of the model, 
since otherwise the inflation due to collinearity would be larger. Such orthogonal components 
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are presumably mainly in the out-of-model predictors used, which would not then be very 
highly correlated with the in-model GRE+GPA predictors, i.e. rOI is not very large. (Obviously it 
would be far easier to reason briefly and accurately about this if the covariances between 
program tier and other variables were given, but they are not included either in the paper(1) or 
the follow-up(2).) Thus to the extent that the positive logits for high-ranked programs are 
caused by their selection of students, even a model omitting rank strata would be likely to 
underestimate the incremental predictive power of including GREs, or at any rate not 
overestimate it by very much. The model including three rank strata is almost certain to 
underestimate these coefficients unless the positive logit for higher ranks is mainly due to those 
programs directly making graduation easier rather than to their effective use of out-of-model 
selection criteria. 
 
The reported data include indications that the odds boost for students in high-ranked programs 
is likely to be due primarily to the out-of-model predictors used in admissions rather than to 
direct student-independent effects of the programs. If some randomly chosen students were 
boosted in enrolled program rank, their graduation probability would increase from the 
hypothetical direct effect but not change for the out-of-model selection effect. In the selection 
case, but not the direct effect case,  the stratified model would then assign this random group a 
negative logit equal to the positive logit assigned to the rank boost. Something approximately 
similar to that randomized trial would happen if the boosted students were picked non-
randomly, but based on traits with little direct relevance to graduation probability. Given the 
almost universal attempt to boost representation of under-represented minorities, we may see 
such artifacts in the logits the model assigns to them. In a causal diagram, effects of 
demographic traits would collide with effects of out-of-model selection traits on program rank. 
As seen in Table 2, the Miller et al. (1)  model does in fact assign the under-represented 
minorities large negative logits, statistically significant in the overall sample, close in magnitude 
to the positive logit assigned to the difference between the first and third rank tier. That 
pattern is more consistent with collider bias in the model than with the more selective 
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programs being easier to complete, although without further information on other possible 
factors, one cannot precisely sort out these systematic effects.  
 
It is ironic that the same stratification collider bias that helps minimize the model’s estimate of 
the predictive value of GREs, nominally for the sake of under-represented minorities, produces 
as collateral damage negative predictive logits for those groups, even after controlling for the 
effects of GREs and GPA. I predict that these negative demographic logits will shrink 
substantially in a less-stratified (and probably more accurate) model omitting program rank, 
and could easily fall to zero or turn positive if a fully unstratified model were possible. I would 
be surprised if the simple analysis without rank strata did not already exist, since Miller et al. 
say they have looked at a variety of models, but it is not given in the paper(1) or the follow-
up(2). Information on how GRE and GPA vary between the tiers is also omitted, making it hard 
to estimate the results for the simple tier-free model. I cannot think of any legitimate reason 
for not releasing the results of a tier-free model to show how inclusion of the three tiers 
changed the results from those that would be found in a model based on predictors rather than 
outcomes of admissions decisions. 
 
Null Hypotheses for Subgroups, Confidence Intervals, and Other Presentation Issues 
As an example of the unusual way in which the data are described, although the point estimate  
given in Table 2 for the coefficient of the logit for GRE-Q in “all” (0.013 per percentile rank) is 
statistically significant, and the point estimate among U.S. females (0.017)  is somewhat larger, 
the latter fact is described as “we see no differences in Ph.D. completion probability…” in 
females.(1)  In typical medical trials, when a treatment appears to work better in a subgroup 
than in the overall group, but with larger uncertainty due to the smaller sample, one does not 
jump to the conclusion that the treatment doesn’t work in the subgroup. In the absence of 
strong prior arguments or strong data, the conventional null assumption is that effects in each 
subgroup approximately equal the overall effect, not that no effect is present in each subgroup. 
The treatment of the null used by Miller et al. (1) would routinely lead to conclusions such as 
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that although a treatment worked well overall it would not work at all in any particular group of 
people, since the uncertainties in any small group are large.  
 
Figure 2 shows very large “95% confidence intervals associated with Ph.D. completion 
probability”, but the meaning of these confidence intervals is not explained. The intervals 
shown are of nearly the same size for the points representing low-scorers, median scorers, and 
high-scorers. Although I do not know with certainty what these “confidence intervals” 
represent, that near-equality at the middle and edges of the distribution tells us that they 
cannot primarily reflect the uncertainty of interest, i.e. uncertainty in the slopes of the logit 
dependence on the model variables, because that would not show up in the middle points. The 
logit intervals extracted from Fig. 2 appear to be the same for U.S. males and females, ~± 1.1 
around the central point. If those intervals are intended to represent some sort of ordinary 
statistical uncertainty, one would expect them to be smaller by a factor of about 2.2 for the U.S. 
male group than for the U.S. female group, because there are four to five times as many males 
as females both in the enrolled students and in the larger test-taking group whose scores are 
represented in Fig.2. The large intervals seem to represent something irrelevant to the slopes 
and independent of the particular population being described.  
 
For large N it’s not hard to calculate that in the middle of the parameter range the 95% 
confidence intervals for the logit should be ±1.96*/(Np(1-p))1/2 just from using the binomial 
variance Np(1-p) and the large-N derivative of the logit with respect to the number of 
graduates, 1/(Np(1-p)), together with a normal distribution. For the full U.S. sample with 
N=2315 and p =~0.7, that would be ±0.09, not ±1.1. 
 
How did these confidence intervals expand by a factor of ~12? One particular algorithm that 
would generate the confidence intervals shown (within my ability to judge from a blown-up 
printout of Figure 2) would be to calculate the confidence interval for the expected graduation 
rate for e.g. the 10th percentile of the U.S. group as if it were based on only the 23 enrolled U.S. 
students in precisely that integer percentile, i.e. not using any information from the other 99% 
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of the students in the group, and then convert the probability range to a logit range. The latter 
step is slightly non-linear due to the small N,  inflating the confidence intervals in the middle of 
the distribution by a bit more than the obvious factor of 1001/2=10. Toward the edges of the 
distribution where the model’s confidence intervals on the slopes contribute to the actual 
uncertainty, the inflation factor is roughly half that size. It may strain credulity to claim that 
anyone would use such an integer-percentile procedure to estimate confidence intervals in the 
context of a linear logit model for which the point estimates are based on all the data, but 
something like that seems to have been done. The visual effect of these radically inflated 
confidence intervals is to de-emphasize the predictive power of the admissions criteria even 
beyond the substantial variance inflation introduced by the model itself. 
 
Rather than directly use the GRE scores themselves in the linear model, the paper uses 
percentile rankings. This is a convenient way to stitch together scores from before and after the 
GRE scale changed. It is not, however, required, since score conversion tables are easily 
available. The percentile method has the effect of greatly compressing the dynamic range in the 
higher scores in the tail of the distribution and magnifying small differences in the meat of the 
distribution, where most accepted applicants are found. Thus it is quite possible that this non-
linear map from raw scores to the predictors used in the linear model reduces the predictive 
power, although perhaps the strong non-linearity happens to approximate an actual non-linear 
dependence. It would be useful to see results of a model using the scores rather than the 
percentiles. 
 
Some smaller features of the presentation style are also problematic.  For predictors whose 
power the authors wish to emphasize (e.g. program rank) the results are often presented in 
terms of odds ratios. For those whose predictive power the authors wish to deemphasize 
(GREs) the results are always presented in terms of percentage differences in completion rates. 
A comparison of completion rates of 75% and 60% gives a rather small-sounding 15% rate 
difference, a medium-sounding logit of 0.69, and an odds ratio of 2, which sounds rather large.  
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Key data (the results of a model without rank stratum, information on covariance of stratum 
with other predictors, ranges of variables on the overall group, predictive coefficients for the 
large non-U.S. group, etc.) remain missing even in the belated follow-up release.(1, 2) Since this 
missing information does not appear in the arXiv follow-up(1, 2), it cannot have been omitted 
simply due to space limitations of the original paper. A small anomaly appears in Table 2 for the 
“non-U.S.” group, whose group logit is given as positive 0.09 but whose group odds ratio is 
given as 0.9, i.e. e-0.09 rather than e+0.09. (1)  
 
The Bottom Line 
Based even on the incomplete data presented, the statistical uncertainty in estimating how 
much predictive strength would be lost by dropping or de-emphasizing GREs is clearly not 
particularly important, despite the claims of the paper. (1)   Nevertheless, a statistically 
significant result from a large sample is not necessarily of much practical significance, as is often 
noted in the distinction between statistical and clinical significance. So how much are the GREs 
actually helping in finding which students are likely to get a degree? We’ve seen that in the U.S. 
group the combined GRE-P and GRE-Q provides a logit difference of ~0.7 (a factor of 2 in odds) 
between the 10th and 90th percentile of U.S. GRE-P test-takers, even before we attempt to make 
any correction for the strong bias toward zero caused by the highly stratified model, or check to 
see if the scores themselves are better predictors than the percentiles. 
 
A little guesswork is needed to compare the 10th-90th percentile logit increments of GRE-Q and 
GPA in the “all” group (including non-U.S.) since the ranges are missing. One strong hint, in 
Table 2 but not commented on in the paper, is that GRE-Q has substantially more statistical 
significance than GPA in this group, i.e. the whole sample in the study. (1) The logit slope vs. 
GRE-Q is about the same overall as in the U.S., according to Table 2. Since logit GPA slope (0.31) 
is much smaller in the All Students group than in the U.S. group (0.60), GRE-Q appears to be 
providing much more predictive power than GPA overall. That conclusion is confirmed by data 
included in Appendix III of the follow-up(2), which shows that in the All group even a simple 
GRE-Q model is substantially superior to a GPA model by either of the model-selection criteria 
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given. Although the follow-up table of model-quality criteria(2)2) (these are based on predictive 
power with a penalty for adding parameters) does not include the obvious model (including 
GPA and the equal-weight sum of GRE-P and GRE-Q) it is not hard to extrapolate from the 
models given to see that by the standard Akaike Information Criterion it is superior to any of 
them by very substantial margins in the All and U.S. groups, significantly in the U.S. male 
subgroup, and approximately tied with GPA alone in the U.S. female subgroup. 
 
 Due to the collider bias from stratification of the model on admissions and post-admissions 
program rank all these logit differences, both for GREs and for GPA,  probably substantially 
underestimate the predictive power that would be lost to admissions committees by dropping 
the predictors in the model. Use of percentiles rather than scores may have also led to 
underestimation for the GREs. There is no reason to believe that the slope of logit vs. GRE 
percentile would become weaker if the range of GREs accepted were extended downward. (6)  
 
One caveat is in order. These data give no compelling reason to think that fields other than 
physics, or even various subfields in physics, will find similar predictive effects. It’s quite 
possible that, e.g., GRE-Q  is more predictive for physics and for quantitative social science 
methods(6) than for many other fields. 
 
Discussion 
The problem of “p-hacking” or “data-dredging” is well-known. (16) Motivated researchers can 
search among many hypotheses to find ones that happen by accident to meet the arbitrary 
conventional p-value criterion for “significance” (3). For approved medical treatment trials, 
since experimenters (e.g. drug companies) typically have intense motivation to find some 
positive results, they are required to file protocols ahead of time specifying which outcomes 
will be tested by which statistical techniques. A similar “registered report” system is now 
spreading to social sciences. (17)  
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The Miller et al. (1) paper appears to be an instance of reverse p-hacking.(18) Some 
“insignificant” p-values are sought and found to confirm the lead author’s often-repeated claim 
(e.g. (10) (19)) that  "the US Ph.D. completion rate in STEM fields is only 50%…. So the standard 
admissions procedure is no better a predictor of success than a coin flip."(19) The logic of that 
claim is identical to that of a claim “Since the 5-year survival rate is only 50% the treatment is 
no better than a placebo”, as if the expected outcomes for the untreated condition, e.g. 
pancreatic cancer or acne, were irrelevant.  Of the athletes admitted to the U.S. Olympic track 
trials, less than 10% graduate to the Olympic team. Is the selection procedure for Olympic trial 
athletes a worse predictor of success than pure chance would be? 
 
Finding spurious negative results is even easier than finding spurious positive results, especially 
when one is free to search through a variety of models before choosing one for “parsimony”.(1) 
One need only combine a few variance-inflators and some stratification on downstream 
variables with a willingness to misinterpret failure to reject the null on some subsamples as 
confirmation of the null. (3)  The claimed null value of the GREs as predictors is an artifact of 
these improper procedures.  
 
The question of what use should be made of the actual predictive power of the GREs remains, 
but that involves non-technical considerations rather than p-values. The issue of how our 
profession should choose its new members faces a variety of not always parallel social goals 
and is fraught with uncertainties, so interesting arguments over ways different institutions 
should improve their selection methods will continue. The effects of changing criteria may not 
even be dominated by the individual-level effects discussed here, but by much harder to predict 
changes in institutional traits. For example, if GRE-P were not used in many graduate 
admissions decisions, many institutions would be likely to change undergraduate physics 
curricula and even grading standards, for better or worse or both.  
 
Despite these difficulties, finding the best selection method is trivial in one limiting case. If we 
do not try to maintain minimal standards of competence and transparency or even basic logic in 
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our treatment of data, then the optimum group of students whom we should be educating is 
the empty set. 
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